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ABSTRACT
Previous studies indicate that microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC) have different operational strategies to MFIs in South Asia (SA). Given the recent emphasis
placed on the feasibility ofMFIs to achieve the dual goals of outreach and sustainability concurrently,
we examine and compare the relationship between sustainability and outreach of MFIs in LAC with
MFIs in SA. Our results indicate that trade-offs exist between outreach and sustainability in both
regions. However, the severity of trade-off is dependent on which goal MFIs decide to focus on in
each region.
Keywords: microfinance, sustainability, outreach, financial performance, South Asia, Latin
America
JEL classification numbers: L26, G21
I. INTRODUCTION
Microfinance emerged in the 1970s as a tool to help alleviate the prevailing poverty conditions
and provide financial services to individuals and households who were excluded from the tradi-
tional financial system. According to a report by the World Bank, the microfinance movement
has fundamentally altered the financial landscape in most developing countries while challeng-
ing the traditional financial system and government thinking. As a result, in Latin America and
South Asia, microfinance provides most of the financial services to low-income individuals and
households (World Bank, 2007). Beyond the role of microfinance in promoting the financial
sector (see, Inoue and Hamori, 2013), the industry has contributed significantly towards the
engagement of women and empowering them towards their social and economic well-being.
In countries such as India and Bangladesh, the emergence of self-help groups (SHGs) has led
to the promotion of female empowerment programmes, and in a socially conservative country
such as Afghanistan, women are accorded explicit recognition as economic agents as a result of
microfinance interventions. Notwithstanding, the microfinance system is largely independent
of the conventional financial sector and very recently, the sustainability of the industry has
raised significant concerns.
Correspondence: Sefa Awaworyi Churchill, Monash University, Wellington Rd, Clayton VIC 3800; Email:
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2 Bulletin of Economic Research
Several studies present arguments supporting the existence of a trade-off between outreach
and sustainability (see, e.g., Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Conning, 1999; Zeller et al., 2003;
Olivares-Polanco, 2005; Quayes and Khalily, 2014). Evidence suggests that in an attempt to
become sustainable, MFIs end up reaching out to the poor (i.e., relatively well-off clients)
rather than the poorest. Navajas et al. (2000) indicate that high transaction costs are catalysts to
the trade-off between financial performance and outreach. Thus, given that smaller loans targeted
to the poorest are expensive, MFIs rather prefer to issue larger loans which are usually targeted
to the less poor in order to become and/or remain financially viable. Evidence presented by Cull
et al. (2007) suggests that microfinance service to the poor and sustainability can be achieved
concurrently. However, there is evidence of a trade-off when the poorest are served. In contrast,
other studies argue that sustainability and outreach depth are complementary objectives and thus
theremaynot necessarily be a trade-off between these goals (see, e.g., Rhyne, 1998;Woller, 2007;
Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Quayes, 2015). Arguments presented in these studies suggest that as
MFIs serve more clients, transaction costs are reduced and this helps in attaining sustainability
since transaction costs are major determinants of financial performance. Relatively few studies
provide evidence to support these arguments. For instance, Fernando (2004), Hishigsuren (2007)
and Makame (2008) use different samples but all came to the conclusion that there is no
significant trade-off between sustainability and outreach.
Considering the emergence of the recent debates concerning the trade-off between micro-
finance sustainability and outreach, we set out to examine whether the trade-off phenomenon
differs between Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and South Asia (SA), and what region
specific features account for the differences, if any. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and
South Asia (SA) are two regions in which the microfinance movement emerged around the same
time (i.e., the 1970s) and have since become well-established in microfinance. However, the
microfinance industry in both regions has developed some distinct characteristics. For instance,
in SA, microfinance is typically rural rather than urban. Microfinance effectively started in SA
at a time when poverty was extensively under scrutiny and thus it is not surprising that the
industry is well rooted in the poverty discourse.
However, in LAC, microfinance is more focused on designing financial products for mi-
croenterprises than on poverty. The industry in LAC also operated more like a business and
thus was seen as a branch of the commercial banking system. This difference in operation can
potentially be attributed to the economic conditions of both regions at the time microfinance
began. Specifically, in the 1970s when microfinance began in Bangladesh, it was driven by a
strong sense of idealism to address issues of poverty in rural areas which was widespread in the
country as a result of the aftermath of the Bangladesh Liberation War. In contrast, as a result
of the collapsing Bolivian populist regime, there was a widespread unemployment which led
to the establishment of Banco Sol to help address issues of urban unemployment (Weiss and
Montgomery, 2005). Thus, microfinance emerged in LAC as a tool to provide credit to the
informal sector in building successful microenterprises in urban areas. This led to the early
embrace of the notion of profitability and commercialization in the region. With these initial
ideological and economic differences surrounding the start of the industry in both regions, and
by composition with LAC, microfinance in SA was more concerned about alleviating poverty
than building successful microenterprises. In addition, microfinance in LAC focused on the
poor rather than the poorest (Rutherford, 2003). Today, the industry in both regions is still char-
acterized by these major differences, with SA more inclined towards the alleviation of poverty
while LAC is more oriented towards the promotion of microenterprises.
Evidence suggests that during the 1970s, apart from cooperatives, the average low-income
household in SA had no access to financial services and if not for microfinance interventions,
they would still be excluded from the financial system. Countries such as Bangladesh and India
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have observed astonishing high growth rates while other countries in the region had later starts
with slower growth but have since been well-established as well. In the 1990s, microfinance
in Bangladesh grew to include millions of clients and for the first time, a large proportion of
low-income households had access to financial services. In India, based on the developed SHGs,
the microfinance industry flourished substantially as well.
Although the microfinance movement in both LAC and SA has evolved significantly, the
limits of the industry becomes evident when it comes to increasing outreach and remaining
financially viable at the same time. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the overall financial
performance of MFIs in both regions is improving as the awareness of sustainability increases.
However, there is a potential trade-off between sustainability and outreach. According to the
WorldBank, for-profit microfinance institutions (MFIs)who are committed to the social goals of
outreach perform better in terms of depth of outreach compared toMFIs that depend on subsidies
(World Bank, 2007). Thus, it is often argued that donor support and subsidies cannot sustain
the microfinance industry (see, e.g., Helms, 2006). Furthermore, with the growing emphasis
on sustainability, anecdotal evidence suggests that focussing on sustainability adversely affects
the social mission of MFIs, especially depth of outreach. This has led to significant debates
however very few empirical studies exist on the issue.
Thus, in this study, we examine if there is a trade-off between sustainability and outreach
in LAC and SA. Using generalized method of moments (GMM) regressions techniques, we
address the issue of endogeneity which has not been addressed fully in the existing literature.
For instance, Cull et al. (2007) did not adequately address issues of endogeneity between
sustainability and outreach. Quayes (2012), on the other hand, attempt to address the issue
of simultaneity but circumvented issues regarding endogeneity. Our study also examines the
relationship between sustainability and outreach breadth, which has not received much attention
in the existing literature. Furthermore, in order to address limitations in measuring sustainability
and outreach, particularly, depth of outreach, we construct measurement indices. Most studies
use average loan size as a measure of outreach depth with the assumption that poorer clients
prefer smaller loan sizes. Thus, it is argued that as the MFI’s average loan size decreases, it
reflects the depth of outreach (i.e., more of the poorest are reached). Using this measure can be
misleading in some cases, especially when there is a general improvement in the MFI’s clientele
and thus clients no longer require small loans. The use of measurement indices adequately
addresses concerns regarding reliability of sustainability and outreach measures used in the
existing literature as it combines the various indicators proposed as proxies for each variable,
thereby capturing various dimensions that a single indicator fails to capture. Furthermore, we
demonstrate empirically, if the profit status of MFIs in LAC and SA affect the outreach and
financial performance of the industry.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section II describes the data and variables
used in this study as well as the details of the measurement index construction process. Section
III gives an overview of the empirical strategy and model specifications. Section IV presents
the empirical results and lastly Section V presents a brief discussion of the results as well as
conclusions and some policy implications.
II. DATA AND VARIABLES
II.1 Data
The data used for this study was collected from the MIX Market database (The MIX). The
MIX provides data on several MFIs worldwide. This data is publicly available and contains
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information self-reported by MFIs to the MIX. Data from the MIX is often regarded as reliable
because the MFI self-reported data is audited by the MIX before it becomes available publicly.
Data from the MIX is widely used by microfinance researchers. For instance, Cull et al. (2007),
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007), Kai (2009), Marr and Awaworyi (2012) and Quayes (2012)
all used data from the MIX. A major limitation associated with the use of data from the MIX is
that data on some relevant variables are not available for certain time periods. The MIX relies
on MFIs to provide them with information in order to compute relevant variables. Thus, where
MFIs fail to provide such information, data from the MIX becomes limited for some relevant
variables. As a result, we use an unbalanced panel dataset in our study.
The study includes data on MFIs from South Asia (SA) and Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC). For both regions, we include data from 2005 to 2012. We include data on 215 MFIs
from six South Asian countries and 332 MFIs from 33 countries in LAC. Table 1 presents a
summary statistics of the data.
II.2 Variables
II.2.1 Dependent variables (Indices). We consider two main variables – outreach and
sustainability. Outreach in microfinance is categorized into two parts; depth of outreach and
breadth of outreach (Schreiner, 2002). With regards to breadth of outreach, given that the total
number of borrowers an MFI has over time gives a good indication of that MFIs outreach, it is
widely considered as an appropriate measure of outreach breadth. In contrast, depth of outreach
is often associated with the ‘quality’ of a MFI’s outreach. Thus, outreach depth concerns the
measure of the poorest in society that MFIs have served. Measuring this variable appears
to be quite complicated (Quayes, 2012). In order to measure depth of outreach accurately,
information on the poverty levels, assets and income levels of clients amongst other things needs
to be obtained. Given the unavailability of such data for each MFI client, the commonly used
measure of outreach depth in the existing literature is the MFI’s average loan size. Microfinance
researchers (see, e.g., Cull et al., 2007; Quayes, 2012) have argued that there is a positive
correlation between the income level of borrowers and the size of loans they require. Thus, it
is expected that poorer clients would opt for smaller loans while the relatively richer clients
would opt for larger loans. Others have also argued that the number of female borrowers is an
appropriate proxy for outreach depth since the most vulnerable in society are usually women
(Bhatt and Shui-Yan, 2001). Thus, MFIs that focus on women are improving their quality of
outreach.
In this study, we construct a measurement index for both depth and breadth of outreach. We
use average loan size and percentage of female borrowers as indicators for depth of outreach. For
breadth of outreach, we use the total number of active borrowers and theMFI’s number of offices
as measures. Number of offices includes the number of branches as well as administrative sites
and other staffed points (e.g., partner local shops), and is highly correlated with the number
of borrowers. The emergence of branchless banking which includes the use of mobile banking
could prevent MFIs from opening more branches but use technology to increase their breadth of
outreach. However, given the level of illiteracy in certain rural areas, the use of technology for
banking is likely to deter some borrowers. Thus, in the absence of offices outreach breath could
be hindered. This suggests that MFIs with more branches have the advantage of attracting more
clients since they make microfinance services more accessible to the poor, especially illiterates.
In our regressions, we use these individual indicators as well as the constructed measurement
indices.
In constructing the measurement indices, first, we rescale all indicators such that all the
reported values range between zero and one. This is done after dealing with all potential
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TABLE 1
Summary statistics
Variable Name Variable Description SA LAC
Sustainability Index Index for Sustainability 0.6476 0.6546
(0.2653) (0.1630)
Outreach Depth Index Index for Outreach Depth 0.7326 0.4415
(0.1496) (0.1909)
Outreach Breadth Index Index for Outreach Breadth 0.4402 0.5053
(0.1158) (0.3131)
Log of OSS Financial Revenue / (Financial 4.6742 4.7034
Expense + Impairment Loss +
Operating Expense)
(0.2824) (0.2352)
Log of ROA (Net Operating Income, less 0.6149 1.0420
Taxes)/ Assets, average (1.1549) (1.1322)
Log of Profit Margin Net Operating Income/ Financial 2.4566 2.4306
Revenue (1.0484) (0.9898)
Percentage of Female Percentage of borrowers who are 85.4462 63.9549
Clients women (25.0022) (19.7303)
Log of ALS Loan Portfolio, Gross / Number 4.9941 6.5862
of Active Borrowers (0.6235) (0.8915)
Log of Total Borrowers Number of borrowers an MFI has 10.6086 9.2669
(1.8407) (1.5314)
Log of Number of Number of staffed points of 3.6648 2.2133
Offices service and administrative sites (1.5584) (1.2308)
Log of Loan Loss Rate (Write-offs - Value of Loans −0.4599 0.2484
Recovered)/ Loan Portfolio,
gross, average
(1.6870) (1.4292)
Log of Loan Portfolio All outstanding loans issued to 15.6115 15.8534
borrowers (1.7947) (1.8137)
Cost per borrower Operating Expense/ Number of 28.0153 197.6583
Active Borrowers (42.0444) 145.933
Yield (Yield on Gross Portfolio 13.5964 30.6246
(nominal) - Inflation Rate)/ (1
+ Inflation Rate)
(8.0177) (20.0556)
Number of Deposit Number of any type of deposit 26.3731 4.0112
Accounts account held by an MFI (37.8793) (20.2183)
Mature MFI (dummy 0.6893 0.8052
variable, Mature MFI
is 1)
(0.4630) (0.3961)
New MFI (dummy 0.1188 0.0607
variable, New MFI is
1)
(0.3237) (0.2388)
Not-for-profit MFIs 0.5817 0.6684
(dummy variable
not-for-profit is 1)
(0.4935) (0.4709)
*Mean and Standard Deviation (in brackets) of sample, based on data from MIX Market.
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outlier problems. Depending on which indicator is being rescaled, the rescaling process is done
differently. For instance, the variables number of offices, the total number of active borrowers
and percentage of female borrowers reflect high outreach only if the recorded values for these
variables are increasing. On the other hand, for average loan size, which is expected to reflect
the quality of outreach, as the reported values get smaller, it gives an indication of good outreach
and vice versa. As a result, in dealing with the former set of variables, we assign the minimum
value of zero to the smallest reported value for each variable and a maximum value of one to
the largest reported value. All other reported values are rescaled to fall between zero and one.
Equation 1 is used for the rescaling of these set of variables. For the latter, we do the opposite
using equation 2. Thus, the smallest value is assigned one and the biggest value zero. We then
take the arithmetic mean of the pair of indicators that fall under each outreach category.
f (x)t =
(ω − α) (xt − At )
t − At + α (1)
f (x)t =
[
(ω − α) (At − xt )
t − At
]
+ α (2)
Where f (x) is the computed re-scaled value, α and ω represent the minimum and maximum
values of the new scale respectively (in our case zero and one). A and represent the minimum
and maximum original values of the indicators reported in the sample respectively.With regards
to sustainability, indicators are chosen to reflect anMFI’s ability to cover its operating costs using
internally generated funds or revenue. Thus, indicators of sustainability are usually associated
with measures of financial performance which can lead to the permanency of MFIs and their
operations.With this understanding, in the existing literature, operational self-sufficiency (OSS),
return on assets (ROA) and profit margin are often used as indicators of sustainability. We use
each indicator individually as a measure of sustainability in our regressions and a sustainability
measurement index constructed from all three indicators. The outreach index construction
process explained above is used here as well and given that for all three sustainability indicators
observed increases in values reflect good performance, we use equation 1 in the rescaling
process.
Lastly, while the indicators included in each of our measurement indices are justified theo-
retically, we also perform a factor analysis to determine if these indices are valid empirically.
From the factor analysis, we note that the highest variance between the indicators in our index is
from the depth of outreach index analysis. Results indicate a variance of 0.25 for the percentage
of female clients. Thus, for all the variables we include in each constructed index, a very low
variance is not accounted for by the other variables, indicating that each variable in our mea-
surement indices are relevant. In addition, the dimensionality of our factors is also well defined
given that results indicate factor loadings higher than 85 percent in all cases.
II.2.2 Control variables. The control variables used in this study are consistent with the
existing literature. Specifically, we control cost per borrower, number of deposit accounts held
by MFIs, MFI age and profit status, as well as loan loss rate and gross loan portfolio. Cost per
borrower is considered as an efficiency indicator in the microfinance literature and computed as
the ratio of a MFI’s operating expense to the total number of active borrowers. A high cost per
borrower ratio suggests that MFIs are facing very high operational costs as such it is expected
that sustainability would be impacted negatively should this ratio increase. Similarly, if loans
become expensive as a result of high cost per borrower, MFIs may resort to the issuance of
bigger loans, which in principle, suggests that depth of outreach is impacted negatively.
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The number of deposit accounts held by MFIs is considered as a proxy for the savings level
of clients. Higher levels of savings accounts are often considered as leverage for financial
institutions, even for economic development. As such, we expect a positive association between
deposit accounts and both sustainability and outreach.
Our age variable is a dummy for MFI age. Data from the MIX groups MFIs into three
categories of age – new, young and mature. Based on this classification, we introduce dummies
for mature and new MFIs in our model, leaving out young as the omitted category. We expect
that older MFIs would have the advantage over younger ones in terms of both sustainability
and outreach. For profit status, we include a dummy for not-for-profit MFIs in order to capture
the effects of MFI profit status on their sustainability and outreach performance. Based on
conventional understanding, we expect that not-for-profit MFIs compared to for-profit MFIs
would perform better in terms of outreach however when it comes to sustainability, we expect
the reverse.
Lastly, an increase in gross loan portfolio is often associated with higher outreach, especially
outreach breadth. Also, as the level of loan default increase, the general expectation is that
financial performance would be affected negatively. Thus, we expect loan loss rate to have a
negative association with sustainability.
III. EMPIRICAL METHODS AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
Although we compare four estimation methods, pooled OLS (POLS), fixed and random effects,
and the system GMM estimates, our main estimation technique is the system GMM. The
system GMM estimator is particularly useful in exploiting the bulk of the variations in our data
to improve the precision of estimates. In addition, endogeneity and reverse causality issues have
been addressed widely using the system GMM estimator. The system GMM estimator is thus
useful in our case given the potential reverse causality between sustainability and outreach. The
GMMModel may be stated as follows:
SUSit = β1 SUSi, t−1 + β ′2Zi t + ϑi + µt + εi t (3)
OUTit = β1 OUTi, t−1 + β ′2P i t + ϑi + µt + εi t (4)
where SUSit and OUTit are sustainability and outreach, respectively. We use the developed
measurement indices as well as the individual indicators involved in the index creation to capture
sustainability and outreach. SUSi, t−1 is the lagged dependent variable in the sustainability model
andOUTi, t−1 is the lagged dependent variable in the outreachmodel. ϑi is the unobserved fixed-
effect term, µt includes time effects, and εi t is the residual term in each model.
Zi t and P i t represent a vector of control variables in the sustainability and outreach regres-
sions, respectively. In the sustainability regression, the control variables, Zi t , besides our main
explanatory variable (i.e., outreach) includes loan loss rate (LLR), cost per borrower (CPB),
number of deposit accounts held (DEP), MFI age and profit status. In the outreach regressions,
besides our main explanatory variable (i.e., sustainability), the control variables include cost per
borrower (CPB), number of deposit accounts (DEP), gross loan portfolio (LP), as well as MFI
age and profit status.
Rewriting equations (3) and (4) as difference equations yields;
SUSit − SUSit−1 = β1 (SUSit−1 − SUSit − 2) + β2 ′ (Zi t − Zi t−1) + (εi t − εi t−1) (5)
OUTi, t − OUTi, t−1 = β1 (OUTi, t−1 − OUTi, t−2) + β2 ′ (P i t−1 − P i t−1) + (εi t − εi t−1) (6)
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Differencing yields unbiased estimates. Specifically, differencing eliminates unobserved coun-
try (ϑi ) and time (µt ) fixed effects, which are possible sources of omitted variable bias. Following
Arellano and Bond (1991), the regressors’ lagged levels are used as instruments to rectify the
potential endogeneity bias, and the correlation between dependent variables and error terms.
This is conventionally referred to as the first difference GMM (GMM-DIF) estimation, which
assumes weak exogeneity of regressors and the non-correlation of error terms. Building on this,
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the first difference GMM estimator may lead to biased
estimates given the presence of weak instruments derived from lagged variables when explana-
tory variables are persistent. Thus, Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrates the efficiency of
the system GMM (GMM-SYS) estimator over the GMM-DIF estimator. Typically, GMM-SYS
estimators generate instruments that remain good predictors for endogenous variables, and thus
perform better than the GMM-DIF estimator when series are persistent (Blundell and Bond,
1998).
We ran regressions in STATA using the two-step estimator consistent with Roodman (2006).
For the GMM estimator to be consistent, it must pass the Hansen J-test of over-identifying
restriction and should have no second-order serial correlation in the error term of the difference.
In GMM-SYS estimations, the over-identifying restriction tests examine the joint validity of
all instruments, and thus work with the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions
are valid. The second-order autocorrelation test examines the null hypothesis that there is no
autocorrelation or that the error term is not serially correlated. To check the validity of the
models, we conducted these required tests. The results are reported at the bottom of each
Table of results. Specifically, given the p-values which are greater than 0.05, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the full set of orthogonality conditions are valid. Similarly, given the
p-values for the autocorrelation test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the first-differenced error terms.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To start with, we compare four estimationsmethods that have frequently been used in the existing
literature: pooled OLS (POLS), fixed and random effects, and the system GMM techniques.
Results for these regressions are reported in Tables 2 and 3, and we combine the data for both
regions in one regression while we include a dummy to control for South Asia. Table 2 report
regressions on the association between sustainability and depth of outreach, while Table 3 reports
on sustainability and breadth of outreach.1 In both tables, Panels 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively,
report results for POLS, fixed effect, random effect, and system GMM.
From Table 2, results suggest a trade-off between sustainability and outreach depth. This is
consistent across all estimation techniques, except for the random effect regression where the
effect of sustainability on outreach is statistically insignificant. Drawing on results from our
preferred estimation technique (i.e., the system GMM), a 1 percent increase in outreach depth
leads to a 0.09 percent decline in sustainability. Similarly, a 1 percent increase in sustainability
leads to a 0.07 percent decline in outreach depth. The regional dummies for South Asia are
also significant suggesting that there are significant variations in the observed results for both
regions.2
Table 3 provides evidence which supports the complementarity between sustainability and
breadth of outreach. Specifically, GMM results show that a 1 percent increase outreach breadth
1Indices of sustainability and outreach are used in these regressions.
2We explore these variations in details in the next sub-section.
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leads to a 0.03 percent increase in sustainability, while a 1 percent increase in sustainability
leads to a 0.02 percent increase in outreach. POLS results also show a similar relationship.
However, for the fixed and random effect models, while sustainability has a positive effect on
outreach breadth, the effect of outreach breadth on sustainability is statistically insignificant.
IV.1 Latin America and the Caribbean Vs South Asia
IV.1.1 Effects using sustainability and outreach indices. Table 4 presents results that
compare LAC and SA. Panel 1 presents results for LAC while Panel 2 for SA. Odd columns
present results for sustainability regressions while even columns present results for outreach.3
FromPanel 1, we observe that at the 1 percent significant level, for LAC, a percentage increase in
depth of outreach leads to a 0.09 percent decline in the level of sustainability while a percentage
increase in sustainability leads to a 0.52 percent decline in outreach depth. This suggests that
there is a trade-off between sustainability and depth of outreach in LAC. Similarly, we observe
that for SA, a 1 percent increase in depth of outreach leads to a 0.12 percent decline in the level
of sustainability while a 1 percent increase in sustainability is associated with a 0.41 percent
decline in the level of outreach depth. Thus, results indicate a trade-off between sustainability
and depth of outreach in both regions. However, we find that MFIs in LAC that focus on
increasing performance in terms of outreach depth perform better with sustainability than MFIs
that do same in SA. This is evident considering the stronger negative coefficients of outreach
depth on sustainability for SA. In contrast, we find that for MFIs in LAC, the decline in outreach
depth when MFIs focus on sustainability is greater than what is observed for MFIs in SA. Thus,
while there is a trade-off between sustainability and depth of outreach in both regions, the
severity of trade-off is dependent on which performance indicators MFIs decide to focus on in
each region.
We now turn to the results for the association between sustainability and breadth of outreach.
Results from Table 4 Panel 1 suggest that, in LAC, there is outreach breadth has no statistically
significant effect on sustainability. However, a 1 percent increase in sustainability leads to a
0.02 percent increase in breadth of outreach. In SA, for a 1 percent increase in sustainability,
there is a corresponding 0.19 percent decline in breadth of outreach. Further, a 1 percent
increase in outreach breadth, leads to a 0.20 percent decline in sustainability in SA. This points
to a trade-off between sustainability and breadth of outreach in SA but not in LAC.
IV.1.2 Sustainability and depth of outreach indicators. Table 5 presents results for the
association between sustainability and depth of outreach using individual indicators included in
our indices. Panel 1, 2 and 3, respectively, present results for the effects of ROA, profit margin
and OSS on depth of outreach indicators. From Panel 1, we observe that for SA, if the percentage
of female clients increases by 1 percent, there is a corresponding 0.09 percent increase in ROA.
However, a 1 percent increase in ROA leads to a 1.96 percent increase in the percentage of
female clients. On the contrary, evidence suggests that there is a trade-off between ROA and
percentage of female clients in LAC. Similar associations are observed in Panels 2 and 3 as
well, where results indicate that there is a trade-off between profit margin and percentage of
female clients in LAC but not in SA. An exception is the case of Panel 3, where results for SA
are statistically insignificant.
From Table 5, we observe that in the case SA, there is no significant effect of ROA on average
loan size. However, an increase in ALS is associated with a 0.6 percent increase in ROA. For
LAC, there is evidence of a trade-off. A 1 percent decrease in depth of outreach (i.e., increase in
3Results here are based on the constructed indices for sustainability and outreach. In the next section, we
also examine the relationship using the individual indicators included in our indices.
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ALS) is associated with a 0.88 percent increase in ROA in LAC. Similarly, a 1 percent increase
in financial performance (ROA) is associated with a 0.08 percent increase in average loan size
(i.e., a decline in outreach depth). With regards to the relationship between profit margin and
average loan size, results from Panel 2 indicate that for both regions, an increase in ALS is
associated with an increase in the profit margin of MFIs while increases in profit margin are
associated with higher ALS. This confirms a trade-off between sustainability (measured by
profit margin) and depth of outreach (measured by ALS).
Furthermore, we note that the effect of a unit increase in profit margin on ALS is stronger for
MFIs in SA than those in LAC. Results also indicate that a 1 percent increase ALS is associated
with a 0.63 percent increase in profit margin in the case of LAC, while for SA, a 1 percent
increase in ALS is associated with a 0.92 percent increase in profit margin. Thus, we find that
MFIs that give bigger loans in SA report higher profit margins than MFIs in LAC. Similar
results are observed in Panel 3 as well, where results are presented for the association between
OSS and ALS. We observe that a 1 percent increase in ALS is associated with a 0.63 percent
and 0.42 percent increase in OSS in SA and LAC, respectively. This suggests that giving out
bigger loans is more rewarding in terms of OSS for MFIs in SA than MFIs in LAC. In addition,
results indicate that depth of outreach is compromised more severely in LAC than in SA when
MFIs attempt to improve their OSS. In essence, in an attempt to improve OSS, MFIs in LAC
tend to give out larger loans compared to MFIs in SA.
IV.1.3 Sustainability and breadth of outreach indicators. Table 6 presents results for
the association between sustainability and breadth of outreach using individual indicators rather
than indices. Trends in the results suggest that overall, there is no trade-off between sustainability
and breath of outreach in both regions. For LAC, across all panels, we note that indicators of
outreach breath are positively associated with sustainability indicators. Specifically, an increase
in each measure of outreach breadth, leads to an increase in sustainability indicators. This
finding is also true for SA but it is not robust across all measures of sustainability.
On the other hand, the effects of sustainability measures on outreach measures are negative,
where significant. For instance, results for SA indicate that a 1 percent increase in MFI profit
margin leads to a 0.36 percent and 0.48% decline in the number of borrowers and offices,
respectively. Similarly, a 1 percent increase in OSS leads to a 1.92 percent decrease in the total
number of borrowers, and a 0.89 percent decline in number of offices. In the case of LAC,
we find that ROA, profit margin and OSS have negative effects on total number of borrowers.
OSS also has a negative effect on the total number of offices. Thus, as MFIs in LAC attempt
to increase profitability in terms of their ROA, profit margin and OSS, it negatively affects the
number of borrowers.
Overall, results indicate that there is no trade-off between sustainability and breadth of
outreach in both LAC and SA. However, while focussing on the expansion of outreach
breadth, MFIs in LAC have the advantage of performing better financially compared to MFIs
in SA.
IV.2 The effects of Other Regressors
Turning to the effects of the other regressors on both sustainability and outreach, we observe
that from Table 2, LLR has a negative effect on sustainability. Thus, as the levels of loan default
increase,MFI sustainability declines. However, GMMM results show a statistically insignificant
effect of LLR on outreach (Tables 2 and 3). For the relationship between cost per borrower and
our sustainability measures, we observe that cost per borrower is negatively associated with
both sustainability and depth of outreach. However, this relationship appears to be quite weak
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with a coefficient of 0.0001. Cost per borrower gives an indication of how expensive loans are.
It is calculated as the ratio of MFI operating expense to the total number of borrowers. Thus, a
higher cost per borrower ratio suggests that loans are expensive and this can deter borrowers.
As a result, when expensive loans drive clients away, it potentially affects their profitability and
consequently sustainability.
The above result leads us to conclude that expensive loans are associated with lower levels of
outreach depth. This suggests that expensive loans (determined by higher cost per borrower) are
associated with an increase in ALS, and therefore a decline in outreach depth. Given that bigger
loans are associated with relatively rich clients, evidence suggests that there is a re-orientation
from the poorest clients to the less poor when operating expenses increase. Furthermore, based
on results from Table 3, breadth of outreach is also compromised when the cost per borrower
increases.
Deposit account serves as a proxy that captures the level of savings among microfinance
clients and we expect that increase in the number of savings account would help MFIs expand
outreach, especially outreach breadth. Examining GMM results from Tables 2 and 3, we observe
that increase in deposit accounts leads to an increase in sustainability and outreach breath.
However, we find no significant effect on depth of outreach. Thus, consistent with economic
theory, an increase in deposit accounts (savings) gives MFIs the leverage to perform well
financially.
For the association betweenMFI age and our outreachmeasures, GMM results are statistically
insignificant for the new MFI dummy. However, across other specifications, the dummy for
mature MFIs is mainly positive and significant while the dummy for new MFIs is negative
in sustainability regressions. Hence we conclude that older MFIs perform better than younger
MFIs in terms of sustainability.
For the relationship between profit status and performance, results from Tables 2 and 3
indicate that compared to for-profit MFIs, not-for-profit MFIs perform poorly in terms of
sustainability. Furthermore, while there is no significant effect of profit status on depth of
outreach, results show that not-for-profit MFIs perform poorly in terms of outreach breadth
compared to for-profit MFIs.
Lastly, for loan portfolio, results show that an increase in the gross loan portfolio leads to
a decrease in outreach depth. On the other hand, as MFIs’ gross loan portfolio increases, the
breadth of outreach also increases. Overall, these results suggest that, higher loan portfolios
for MFIs could lead to mission drift. This is evident given that our results indicate a positive
association between outreach breadth and gross loan portfolio but a negative association between
depth of outreach and gross loan portfolio.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The paper has dealt with the issue of possible trade-off (or not) between financial sustainability
and outreach performance by MFIs in two known major microfinance regions in the world,
namelySouthAsia (SA) andLatinAmerica and theCaribbean (LAC). Even thoughmicrofinance
emerged about the same time in both regions, the industry in each has presented differing
characteristics over time. One of the most enduring and prominent dissimilarities is the fact that,
due to the prevailing economic conditions in the regions, LAC adopted an early approach towards
the notion of profitability when running microfinance institutions, while in SA, MFIs were
primarily concerned with alleviating poverty and aiming at targeting the poorest households.
Our research findings indicate that trade-offs exist between depth of outreach and financial
sustainability in both regions. Interestingly, our evidence seems to suggest that there are limits to
Au
tho
r's
 m
an
us
cri
pt
22 Bulletin of Economic Research
the particular strategic focus that each geographical area has specialized in. That is to say, where
the emphasis has been primarily on achieving financial sustainability (as in LAC), persistence
in maintaining this focus leads to a greater loss in depth of outreach compared to SA. Similarly,
a continuous emphasis on depth of outreach compromises financial sustainability to a greater
extent in SA than in LAC. This suggests that a more balanced strategy is recommended in
both regions whereby both depth of outreach and financial sustainability are pursued as long
as they complement each other. To this end, further research is needed in order to answer key
questions such as: where do these strategic limits lie? Is it possible to avoid over-stepping these
limits? What policies need to be implemented so as to identify frontiers and ways to improve
strategies?
Further evidence of trade-off demonstrates a connection to the particularities of each region.
For instance, our findings show that MFIs in SA have to issue larger loan amounts than those in
LAC for one unit increase in profit margin and one unit increase in OSS. This may be explained
by the fact that, generally speaking, in SA disbursed loan amounts start at a much lower base
than those in LAC. This relates to the particular focus on poverty alleviation in SA. For this
reason, MFIs in SA need a much larger increase in loan amounts to achieve a 1 percent increase
in profit margin or OSS.
However, in terms of outreach to female clients, our research findings provide mixed results.
While there is no trade-off in SA between financial sustainability and reaching female clients,
LAC extends less finance to women when focussing on financial sustainability. The reason for
the latter finding might be because provision for female clients demands the extension of other
services such as health protection and group formation, while these services are well established
in SA, particularly in India, via self-help groups.
In conclusion, our study has shown that trade-offs between the two major microfinance goals
still exist in some important aspects and that these relate closely to the particular strategies that
each of the regions has chosen to emphasize. Thus, it would be in the best interest ofmicrofinance
practitioners and policymakers to assess the benefits and costs ofmaintaining such strategies and
those of adopting new mechanisms, which can lead to greater complementarity of objectives.
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